Endemic violence in primitive communities

A Blood-Soaked Land: Part II

Robert Hill, Quadrant, Aug 21 2026

Cultural lethal violence was institutionalised in Aboriginal societies in a way that sustained warfare was not. Payback and retaliatory punishment could be socially sanctioned or obligatory, but there were no standing armies, permanent commands or institutions for sustained military campaigning. The deep record is therefore one of recurring lethal violence, not continuous war.

The same caution should apply to the frontier. Killing, reprisal and punitive expedition did not automatically become “war” merely because one participant was British. Yet modern revisionism increasingly reverses the categories: raid and reprisal between Aboriginal groups remain “feud” or “payback”, while analogous episodes involving the British are aggregated across decades and vast distances into “Frontier Wars”. In the process, scattered resistance is retrospectively endowed with a military coherence the underlying social organisation did not possess.

Demographically, the terminology changes nothing. A man killed in revenge is no less dead because his death is called payback rather than warfare. What matters is frequency, lethality and persistence.

Comparative anthropology reinforces the distinction. Lawrence Keeley, professor of anthropology at the University of Illinois at Chicago and author of the influential Oxford University Press study War Before Civilization, showed from archaeological and ethnographic evidence that recurring raids and relatively small clashes could impose heavy proportional losses on non-state populations. More revealing still are anthropologists Douglas Fry and Patrik Söderberg. In a peer-reviewed 2013 study published in Science, they systematically examined lethal aggression in 21 mobile forager societies drawn from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. Their conclusion cuts against claims of ubiquitous primitive warfare: most lethal incidents were homicide, interpersonal disputes or feud, while warfare constituted only a minority.

That does not weaken the argument. It defines it.

Read the rest HERE . . .

Read Robert Hill’s The myth of Invasion

Whitlam’s Aboriginal Land Rights Act

‘The Aboriginal Land Rights Act was a Whitlam-era ideological experiment premised on the fantasy that land transfer and autonomy would allow Aboriginal people to revert to a viable “traditional” existence inside a modern nation-state. Wadeye is the living wreckage of that idea.

‘Fifty years on, it has no real economy, no self-sufficiency, no civic order, and no credible path forward. Land has been handed over, and the result is not empowerment but stagnation, violence, and permanent dependency. Wadeye is not transitional. It is the end state of a policy that mistook symbolic restitution for governance. No government has been willing to confront or unwind the model, because any attempt at reform is immediately racialised and treated as illegitimate . . .

‘The Northern Land Council is not a marginal or impoverished body. It is one of the wealthiest statutory land councils in Australia, controlling vast territories, negotiating resource agreements worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and maintaining substantial financial reserves. It asserts authority over land use, access, and exclusion, yet disclaims any operational responsibility for safety, order, or civil peace on the land it controls.’ These are quotations from Robert Hill’s Quadrant article, Welcome to Wadeye.

Read the rest HERE . . .